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1.  Introduction 
 
The underlined DPs in (1) are known in the literature (Baker 1968, Grimshaw 
1979, Heim 1979, Romero 2005) as ‘concealed questions’ (CQs) because they 
can intuitively be paraphrased as the corresponding embedded questions in (2): 1  
 
(1)  a.  Meg has forgotten the capital of Italy.   
b.  Kim knows the governor of California.         
c.  They revealed the winner of the contest.  
   
(2)  a.  Meg has forgotten what the capital of Italy is.    
b.  Kim knows who the governor of California is.       
c.  They revealed who the winner of the contest was.     
 
All the sentences in (1) are ambiguous between a CQ-reading (exemplified in 2a-
c) and a reading in which the underlined DPs are not CQs. For example, (1a) can 
also mean that Meg has lost her personal memories of Rome; similarly, (1b) can 
mean that Kim is personally acquainted with Arnold Schwarzenegger. Perhaps a 
little less frequently, (1c) can mean that somebody has discovered the winner of 
the contest by physically removing whatever was covering him. The readings in 
which the DPs are not treated as CQs are not of interest in this paper.   
 In (2), I paraphrased the underlined DPs in (1) with embedded questions. 
Is this just a useful way to capture their meaning intuitively, or should we say 
that, although they surface as DPs, they are actually questions at some level of 
representation? If not, how can we account for their apparent question-meanings? 
In this paper, I provide arguments against the idea that DP-CQs denote questions. 
Instead, I propose an analysis that treats these DPs as denoting properties and I 
argue that their apparent question meaning is derived by independently-motivated 
semantic selection properties of the embedding predicates.  
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the hypothesis that 
CQs are indeed questions at some level of representation (the question-in-disguise 
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 approach) as argued for by Baker (1968) and Grimshaw (1979). Section 3 
presents three arguments against the idea that CQs denote questions and discusses 
new data on indefinite CQs. Section 4 reviews Heim and Romero’s individual 
concept approach as an alternative to the question-in-disguise approach, and 
argues that this account is not fully satisfactory either. Section 5 introduces a new 
analysis of CQs that I will call the de re analysis of CQs. Finally, Sections 6 and 7 
discuss further issues and implementations of the de re analysis of CQs. 
 
 
2.  The Question-in-Disguise Approach 
 
Baker (1968) argued that the underlined DPs in (1) are generated as questions and 
that the unpronounced material is deleted by some process of ellipsis, as shown in 
(3) below: 
 
(3) Kim knows [CP who the governor of California is]       
 
Baker’s proposal can easily account for the question meanings exhibited by the 
underlined DPs in (1) under the assumption that the interpretation process applies 
to structures like (3) before the ellipsis takes place.  
In saying that CQs are covert questions, this theory provides an interesting 
generalization regarding their distribution: CQs will only occur with predicates 
that select for wh-questions (Baker 1968). This generalization can explain the 
contrast between predicates like know, forget and reveal in (1a-c), which 
syntactically embed wh-questions and allow for CQ readings of their DP 
complements, and predicates like believe, think and deny which do neither, as 
shown in (4 a-c). 
 
(4) a. *Meg believed the capital of Italy. 
 a'. *Meg believed what the capital of Italy is.  
 b.  *Kim thought the governor of California. 
 b'. *Kim thought who the governor of California was. 
 c.  *John denied the winner of contest. 
 c'. *John denied who the winner of the contest was.  
 
Baker’s approach has thus at least two advantages: it can easily account for the 
question meanings exhibited by DP-CQs, and it also makes an important 
prediction regarding their restricted distribution. 
 Grimshaw (1979) showed that CQs are not allowed with just any predicate 
that takes wh-questions. The following examples are from Grimshaw (1979: 302): 
 
(5)  a. *I wonder the answer he gave. 
  a'. I wonder what answer he gave. 
 b. *John inquired the number of students in the class.  
 b'. John inquired what the number of students in the class was 
 c. *I don’t care the height the plants grow to. 
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        c'. I don’t care what height the plants grow to. 
 
In order to account for the facts in (5), Grimshaw proposed to distinguish between 
syntactic subcategorization and semantic selection features of the embedding 
verb. She argues, contra Baker, that CQs are syntactically DPs that are only 
semantically interpreted as questions (via a translation rule – Grimshaw’s CQ 
Rule). From this, Grimshaw derives that only verbs that syntactically 
subcategorize for DPs and semantically select questions can embed CQs. The 
table in (6) illustrates the lexical entries of three classes of verbs in Grimshaw’s 
system. As the table shows, only verbs of the know-class, which syntactically 
subcategorize for DPs and semantically select questions, can embed CQs. Verbs 
in the believe-class fail to embed CQs since they semantically do not select for 
question-type meanings, while verbs in the wonder-class fail to embed CQs 
because they don’t subcategorize for DP arguments. 2  
 
(6)     Syntactic subcategorization  Semantic selection  
     Know [DP,CP]         <Q,P> 
     Believe [DP,CP]        <P> 
     Wonder [CP]          <Q> 
 
In this section, we saw two ways to implement what we can call the question-in-
disguise approach. Grimshaw (1979) and Baker (1968) propose that at some level 
of linguistic representation DPs with CQ readings are treated as questions, either 
syntactically and semantically (Baker) or just semantically (Grimshaw). In the 
next sections, I present three arguments against this way of analyzing CQs. 
 
 
3.  Why Concealed Questions Do Not Denote Questions 
 
3.1.  Why Only Identity Questions? 
 
Nathan (2006) shows that CQs can only have the identity-question meanings who 
X is or what X is. Other questions, such as where X is or when X is, are not 
possible meanings for a CQ, even when they are made salient by the context. 
Consider, for instance, the following examples, from Nathan (2006: 6): 
 
(7) a. Leslie needed directions, so I told her where the capital of Vermont is. 
 b. #Leslie needed directions, so I told her the capital of Vermont. 
 c. Leslie was studying for a geography quiz, so I told her the capital of 
Vermont. 
 
(8) a. Alex wants to be on time, so I told him when the class he should attend 
is. 
 b. #Alex wants to be on time, so I told him the class he should attend. 
                                                 
2In the table, ‘P’ stands for the semantic type of propositions and ‘Q’ stands for the semantic 
type of questions 
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  c. Alex wants to learn semantics, so I told him the class he should attend. 
 
This pattern is difficult to explain under the question-in-disguise approach. Under 
this approach, nothing seems to prevent (7b) from having an underlying 
representation like (9): 
 
(9) Leslie needed directions, so I told her [ where the capital of Vermont is] 
 
A possible way to explain these facts is to say that Grimshaw’s CQ-Rule 
translates DP-CQs only as identity questions.3 In the following sections, we will 
see that even if we allow this possibility, the question-in-disguise approach will 
have to be rejected because CQs do not always have the same truth-conditions as 
the corresponding embedded identity-questions.  
 
3.2.  Greenberg’s Contrast 
 
Heim (1979) reports a discussion from B. Greenberg (1977) about the contrast 
between the CQ sentence (10a) and its identity-question paraphrase in (10b). 
 
(10) a. John found out the murderer of Smith. 
 b. John found out who the murderer of Smith was. 
 
Following Greenberg, Heim observes that the embedded identity-question 
sentence in (10b) shows an ambiguity that is absent from its CQ-counterpart: 
 
“[(10b)] cannot only be used to express that John solved the question who 
murdered Smith, but has a further reading which is perfectly compatible 
with John’s being entirely ignorant about Smith’s murder, and which only 
amounts to the claim that John found out some essential fact or other (e.g. 
that he was his brother) about the person referred to as “the murderer of 
Smith”. But this is not an available reading for [(10a)], which can only be 
used in the first-mentioned way.”                                   
                                                                                            (Heim, 1979: 53) 
 
The contrast in meaning between (10a) and (10b) shows that question paraphrases 
do not always correctly characterize the meaning of a sentence containing a CQ. 
This is clearly a problem for the question-in-disguise approach. Under this view, 
(10a) and (10b) should have identical representations at Logical Form. Therefore, 
their truth-conditions should not differ.  
 
3.3.  Indefinite CQs 
 
Another serious challenge for the question-in-disguise approach is represented by 
indefinite descriptions with CQ readings. Some examples are provided in (11). 
 
                                                 
3Nathan (2006) explores this possibility. See Nathan (2006), pg. 17.  
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 (11) a. John knows a doctor that can treat your illness. 
 b.  Mary knows a detective in the Pioneer Valley. 
 
Before seeing why indefinite descriptions are problematic for the question-in-
disguise approach, we have to make sure that we are dealing with real CQs.  
One way to argue that (11a-b) are real CQs, is to present evidence that these 
sentences are ambiguous in the same way (1a-c) are. Suppose the underlined DPs 
in (11a-c) did not have CQ-readings. If so, they should only have acquaintance 
readings similar, for instance, to the reading of (1b) in which Kim is personally 
acquainted with Arnold Schwarzenegger. However, this is not the only reading 
available for the sentences in (11): they also have CQ-readings. The two scenarios 
below serve to bring out the ambiguity for (11a). 
 
Scenario 1 (acquaintance-know)   
John is friends with Karl, who is a doctor in the Pioneer Valley specialized in 
migraines. I know that you have been suffering from migraines and I am telling 
you that John knows a doctor in the Pioneer Valley that can treat your illness.  
 
In Scenario 1, the object DP in (11a) is not interpreted as a CQ and the sentence 
roughly means that John is personally acquainted with a particular doctor (Karl). 
Now, consider (11a) in a slightly different scenario: 
 
Scenario 2 (CQ-embedding know) 
John and I have been talking about your migraines and John told me that he 
has read in the Pioneer Valley medical gazette that Dr. Karl Mang has done 
outstanding research on the treatment of migraines. 
 
In Scenario 2, (11a) can be paraphrased as (12):  
 
(12)  John knows of a certain doctor (K. Mang) that he can treat your illness. 
 
Under this reading, John doesn’t need to be acquainted with Karl in the same way 
he was acquainted with him on the previous reading. To make this point even 
clearer, notice that that the two readings differ with respect to certain entailments, 
originally used by Heim (1979) to point out the same ambiguity in definite CQs.  
 
(13) a. John knows a doctor that can treat your illness. 
  b.  Every doctor that can treat your illness is also a golf instructor. 
 c. John knows a golf instructor. 
 
The entailment in (13) goes through only under the acquaintance reading: if John 
is acquainted with a certain doctor that can treat your illness and that doctor 
happens to be a golf instructor, it follows that John is also acquainted with a golf 
instructor even though he might not be aware of it. Under the CQ-reading, on the 
other hand, if John knows that Karl is a doctor that can treat your illness and Karl 
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 happens to be a golf instructor, we cannot infer that John knows that Karl is a golf 
instructor.  
 Further evidence for the existence of CQ-readings involving indefinite 
descriptions comes from languages like German and Italian that lexically 
distinguish two different predicates corresponding to English know: wissen and 
kennen in German; sapere and conoscere in Italian. When wissen and sapere take 
DP arguments, only the CQ-reading is available. This is shown for sapere in (14). 
 
(14) Giovanni  sa         il    presidente del      Congo.                     *acquaintance 
         Giovanni  knows  the president   of-the  Congo. 
        ‘Giovanni knows the president of Congo.’ 
 
Notice that both sapere and wissen can embed indefinite descriptions with CQ-
meanings, as shown in (15) and (16) below. 
 
(15) Italian “sapere” 
 a. So               un posto   dove   possiamo nasconderci.    
 know(1st, SG)  a   place   where  can(1st, PL)  hide.     
             ‘I know a place where we can hide.’ 
 b. Chi   sa        un programma per mixare e     cambiare la   voce? 
 Who knows a   program      to   mix      and change    the voice?   
 ‘Who knows a program to mix and change voices?’          (Google) 
 
(16) German “wissen” 
      a. Maria weiß    ein Hotel, das  noch zwei Zimmer frei hat. 
  Maria knows a     hotel   that still   two  rooms    free has. 
          ‘Maria knows a hotel that still has two rooms available. 
 b. Ich weiß  einen geheimen Weg. 
  I     know a        secret       path. 
     ‘I know a secret path.’              (Google) 
  
Now that we have established that indefinite descriptions can have CQ-readings, 
we can see why they are problematic for the question-in-disguise approach. 
Compare (11a) with its embedded-question counterpart (17): 
 
(17) John knows who is a doctor that can treat your illness. 
  
It is clear that (11a) and (17) do not have the same truth-conditions.  (17) implies 
that John knows the exhaustive list of doctors that can treat your illness. In 
contrast, in order for (11a) to be true, John simply needs to know one doctor that 
can treat your illness. Indefinite descriptions thus show that the readings we are 






 4.  The Individual Concept Approach 
 
4.1.  Heim (1979) and Romero (2005) 
 
Heim (1979) explores the possibility that DPs with CQ interpretations denote 
individual concepts, i.e. functions of type <s,e> and that the CQ-embedding 
version of know (henceforth, knowCQ-DP) denotes a relation between an individual 
(the holder of the attitude) and an individual concept (the object DP-CQ). 
 
“Intuitively, this represents the relation of knowing, as referred to in “John 
knows Bill’s telephone number”, as a relation between a person on one 
side and a certain function from points of reference into numbers on the 
other side. (…) Roughly characterized, this relation of knowing holds 
between X and Y at i iff X is at i able to identify the value Y(i) that Y 
yields when applied to i.”                                                                
                                                                                                  (Heim, 1979: 56) 
Consider (18) below: 
 
(18) John knows the capital of Italy. 
 
Under the individual concept approach (IC-approach), the DP the capital of Italy 
denotes a function from points of reference (pairs of worlds and times) into 
individuals that are capitals of Italy at that point of reference. (19) could be an 
example of such a function: 
 
(19)           [w0, 2006]  →      Rome   [w0,  1944] →    Salerno 
  [w1, 2006] →    Florence   … 
 
Intuitively, (18) is true at the actual world-time combination [w0, 2006] iff John is 
able to identify the value that the function denoted by the capital of Italy yields 
when applied to [w0, 2006]. In other words, (18) is true at the point of reference 
[w0, 2006] iff John knows that Rome is the value of the function denoted by the 
capital of Italy at that point of reference. In (20) and (21), below, I show 
Romero’s implementation of Heim’s proposal: 
 
(20) [[knowCQNP]] = λy<s,e> λxe λw.∀w'∈ Doxx(w) [y(w') = y(w)] 
(21) [[John knows the capital of Italy]] = 
         λw.∀w'∈ Doxj(w) [ιxe[capital-of-Italy(x,w')] = ιxe[capital-of-Italy(x,w)]]4 
 
An important advantage of the IC-approach is that it does not resort to a question-
type denotation for the DP-CQ. Thus, this approach does not need to explain the 
fact that only identity questions constitute good paraphrases for CQs and, even 
                                                 
4What the formula in (21) says is that “for all of John’s doxastic alternatives w', the value of 
the relevant individual concept at w' is exactly what it is in the actual world w.” (Romero 2005: 6). 
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 more importantly, it doesn’t have to face the difficulty raised by differences in 
meaning between CQs and their corresponding identity questions paraphrases. 
4.2.  Problems for the Individual Concept Approach 
 
4.2.1.   Indefinite CQs 
 
When considering indefinites, however, the parallel with individual concepts 
becomes much weaker. It is clear that (11a), for example, is compatible with a 
scenario in which there are several doctors that can treat your illness. All we need 
for (11a) to be true is that John knows one of them. Thus, the meaning of a doctor 
that can treat your illness cannot be described as having an individual concept 
denotation, i.e. as a function from points of reference into single individuals -
since at the same point of reference there might be more than one individual that 
satisfies the description. One could enrich the inventory of DP-CQ denotations to 
include intensional properties (i.e. entities of type <s <e,t>>). Although this might 
represent a more suitable denotation for indefinite DPs, it’s still not clear how we 
can predict the correct truth-conditions of (11a). If the indefinite DP in (11a) is of 
type <s <e,t>>, then its denotation will be a function that maps a world w into the 
set of individuals that are doctors that can treat your illness in w. Imagine that at 
the world of evaluation w0 this set consists of Karl, Max and Sue; then (22) 
represents the extension of the function at w0:  
 
(22) w0   → {Karl, Max, Sue} 
 
Following Heim’s analysis, knowing the value of the function would amount to 
knowing of all the members in the set (Karl, Max and Sue) that they are the 
doctors that can treat your illness in w0. This, as we discussed before, correctly 
describes the meaning of the embedded question paraphrase ‘John knows who is a 
doctor that can treat your illness’, but not the meaning of (11a).5 
 
 
4.2.2.  The Distribution of CQs  
 
It is also not clear how the IC-approach can account for the restricted distribution 
of CQs. The underlined DPs in (4a-c) and (5a-c) from Section 2 can all be 
analyzed as individual concepts but the examples are ungrammatical. In order to 
account for the ungrammaticality of (4a-c) and (5a-c), the IC-approach will 
presumably have to resort to some independent syntactic explanation along the 
lines of Grimshaw and say that (4a-c) and (5a-c) are ungrammatical because the 
verbs occurring in these sentences do not have arguments of the required kind.  
 However, notice that even when syntactic subcategorization is satisfied, a 
CQ-reading is not always available. This is shown in (23a-c). 
                                                 
5This is, of course, the simplest attempt to extend the IC-approach to the case of indefinites. 
There could be other ways to account for the indefinite cases. Romero (2005), for example, makes 
use of a ‘mention-some’ Answer operator. I will leave this point open and let the proponents of the 
IC-approach find the best account for the challenging case represented by indefinites.  
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(23) a. I wondered about the price of the car. 
 b. John inquired about the winner of the contest. 
 c. Kim doesn’t care about the president of the US. 
 
The most natural reading of (23c) is that Kim doesn’t care about the person 
referred to as ‘the president of the US’, rather than Kim doesn’t care about the 
identity of the president of the US.6 The examples in (23) are, therefore, a 
problem for any account that resorts to an explanation à la Grimshaw.  
In this section, I have explored the IC-approach to CQs and argued that 
this theory isn’t completely satisfying for two reasons: first, it does not directly 
apply to the case of indefinite CQs, and second, it does not directly account for 
the restricted distribution of CQs. In the following section, I will introduce a new 
analysis of CQs. I will argue that CQs are de re belief ascriptions (in the sense of 
Quine 1956 and Lewis 1979) and that they only appear with factive verbs because 
of independently-motivated semantic selection properties of these verbs (Kratzer 
1990, 2002). This proposal, I argue, has the advantage of capturing the right truth-
conditions for both definite and indefinite DPs with CQ readings and at the same 
time, accounting for their restricted distribution.  
 
 
5.  The de re Analysis of CQs 
 
5.1.  Factivity and the Semantics of  know 
 
Consider a sentence in which know takes a propositional complement, like (24): 
 
(24) Jan knows that the GLSA manager is blond. 
 
What does it mean to know the proposition that the GLSA manager is blond? One 
hypothesis might be that to know the proposition expressed by this sentence is the 
same thing as to be in a world in which that proposition is true and to believe that 
it is so. However, things are not this easy.7 Imagine a scenario in which the GLSA 
manager in the actual world is Matt and Matt is blond. Jan, however, mistakenly 
thinks that his officemate Monica, who also happens to be blond, is the GLSA 
manager. According to the hypothesis in which knowledge corresponds to true 
                                                 
6Maybe a better way to put it is to say that sentences (23a-c) are somewhat vague. There are 
many situations that you can describe by saying that I wondered about the price of the car. For 
example, I might have wondered whether it was a good or fair price, whether I could afford it, etc. 
A reading similar to the CQ meaning ‘I wondered what the price of the car was’ might also be 
available as a result of some inference process from this vague meaning. This is particularly the 
case with definite descriptions that denote numbers, like the price, the height, the distance, etc. In 
these cases, the CQ-meaning might become more prominent since it is harder to imagine a way in 
which a person can be acquainted with a number apart from wondering/knowing what that number 
is.  
7The following example is not original. Similar examples have been extensively discussed in 
the philosophical literature since Russell (1912). See also Gettier (1963).  
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 belief, we can conclude that (24) is true, since Jan believes a true proposition, 
namely that the GLSA manager - whoever that happens to be - is blond. In this 
scenario, however, (24) would still be false. Kratzer (1990, 2002) proposes a 
semantics for factive verbs that takes care of cases like these. She argues that 
sentences of the type in (24) have the truth-conditions in (25): 
 
(25) S knows p in w if and only if there is some fact s that exemplifies p in w 
and S believes p de re of s.8,9 
 
According to (25), (24) is true if and only if Jan believes that the GLSA manager 
is blond de re of an actual fact exemplifying the proposition denoted by (24). In 
our scenario, the actual fact exemplifying the proposition that the GLSA manager 
is blond is the fact that Matt is blond. But, that fact is not a fact that Jan has a de 
re belief about. (25), thus, correctly predicts (24) to be false, given Jan’s beliefs.  
 According to Kratzer, factive verbs are special in the sense that they select 
for an argument that characterizes both the external (the fact of which the belief is 
about, i.e. the res) and the internal content of the attitude (the information content 
of the belief ascription). When know takes a propositional complement, the that-
clause helps identify both the external and the internal content of the attitude: 
 
“In knowledge ascriptions, the ‘that’-clause seems to have a double 
function. One is to characterize the information content of the belief 
ascribed. The other one is to characterize a fact that the belief ascribed is a 
belief of. That is, the ‘that’-clause also helps pick out the res of the belief. 
This res is not a proposition. It is a worldly thing, a situation.”     
                    (Kratzer, 2002: 659) 
 
In the next section, I show how Kratzer’s analysis of factive verbs can be 
extended to account for CQs with minimal modifications.  
 
5.2.  The de re Analysis of CQs - Some Examples 
 
In analogy with Kratzer’s analysis of factive verbs that embed propositions, we 
can characterize (1b) as describing a de re belief about a particular individual of 
which the property being the governor of California holds in the actual world. 
The example in (1b) can thus be paraphrased as (1b'): 
 
(1) b. Kim knows the governor of California. 
 b'. Kim knows of A. Schwarzenegger that he is the governor of California 
                                                 
8In Kratzer’s system, facts are situations. A speaker S believes p de re of a situation s iff the 
following conditions are met (from Kratzer, 2004): 
• there is an acquaintance relation R that S bears to s, and only s in the actual world and 
• all of S’s doxastic alternatives are part of situations where the unique situation they bear 
R to is one where p is true.  
9For the definition of fact that exemplifies a proposition, see Kratzer (2002).  
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 In the case of CQs, it is the DP that has a double role. On the one hand, it helps 
pick out the res argument of which the belief is about, i.e. the individual of which 
the property holds in the actual world (the external content of the attitude); on the 
other hand, it provides the property that is ascribed to the res argument (the 
internal content of the attitude). 
 The denotation for knowDP-CQ and the schematic truth-conditions for a CQ-
sentence are given in (26) and (27) below. 
 
(26) [[knowDP-CQ]] =  
 λP<e <s,t>>.λxe. λw. ∃ye [P(y)(w) & ∀w' (Dox(x)(w)(w')→ P(y)(w'))]  
 
(27) x knows P in w if and only if there is some individual y of which P holds in 
w and x believes P de re of y.  
 
This account assumes that definite descriptions can denote properties. This has 
been previously argued for in the literature (see Heim 1982, Partee 1986, 
Mikkelsen 2004).10 For the formal implementation of the analysis, I will follow 
Partee (1986) and assume that the type shifter ident is responsible for shifting the 
denotation of the definite description into a property.11 The derivation of a 
sentence containing a definite DP-CQ is shown in (28) below. 
 
(28)                     IP 
                 
    DP                     VP 
 
 John          V                       DP2 
                        
                          knows      ident                    DP1 
                                       
                                              the governor of California                                                         
 
1. [[the governor of California]] = λw. ιye [governor-of-CA(y)(w)]   <s,e> 
2. [[ident]] = λI<s,e> λxe λw. x = I(w)                                         <<s,e> ,<e, st>>  
3.  [[DP2]] = λxe λw. [x = ιye [governor-of-CA(y)(w)]]                            <e, st> 
4.  [[John knows the governor of California]](w0) =  
       ∃xe [x = ιye [governor-of-CA(y)(w0)] & ∀w (Doxj(w0)(w) →  
                                                                            x = ιye [governor-of-CA(y)(w)])]12 
                                                 
10Mikkelsen (2004) argued that subjects of specificational clauses denote properties. In 
contrast to (i), which has a referential subject, the use of ‘it’ in (ii) indicates a property 
interpretation for the definite description. Interestingly, this carries over to the CQ in (iii): 
i. The winner of the contest is Iranian. Isn’t she/ *it?     (PREDICATIONAL) 
ii. The winner of the contest is Susan. Isn’t it/ *she?     (SPECIFICATIONAL) 
iii. I know the winner of the contest. It’s Susan/ *She is Susan.      (CQ) 
11To be more precise, I am using an intensional version of Partee’s type shifter ident.  
12For simplicity, I am assuming that a given individual can exist in more than one world. 
However, all these formulas can be translated in a Lewis-style counterpart system. 
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 This analysis can also be easily extended to the case of plural definite 
descriptions. Assuming Link’s σ-operator, the simplified truth-conditions of (29a) 
are given in (29c) below: 
 
(29) a. Susie knows the colors of the US flag. 
 b. [[the colors of the US flag]] = λx λw. (x = σy [colors-US-flag(y)(w)]) 
 c. [[Susie knows the colors of the US flag]](w0)= 
          ∃x [x = σy [colors-US-flag (y)(w0)] & ∀w (Doxs(w0)(w) →  
                x = σy [colors-US-flag (y)(w)])]                                              
 
The de re analysis has the advantage of easily accounting for indefinite CQs. 
Assuming that an indefinite does not have independent quantificational force (see 
Heim 1982), its denotation is a simple property that can combine directly with the 
denotation of knowDP-CQ given in (26). An example is shown in (30) below: 
 
 (30) a. Pat knows a shortcut to UMASS.  
         b. [[a shortcut to UMASS]] = λxe λw. (shortcut-to-UM(x)(w)) 
         c. [[Pat knows a shortcut to UMASS]] (w0) = 
          ∃y [shortcut-to-UM (y)(w0) & ∀w' (Doxp(w0)(w) →  
                   shortcut-to-UM(y)(w))] 
 
The analysis can also be easily extended to account for bound variable 
interpretations of indefinites, as shown in (31): 
 
 (31) a. Every nurse at the hospital knows a doctor in the Pioneer Valley. 
 b. [[Every nurse at the hospital knows a doctor in the Pioneer V.]](w0) = 
      ∀x [nurse-in-hospital(x)(w0) → ∃y [doctor-in-PV(y)(w0) &  
                    ∀w (Doxx(w0)(w) → doctor-in-PV(y)(w))]] 
 
To conclude, the de re analysis of CQs provides a uniform account of definite and 
indefinite CQs by simply resorting to independently-motivated assumptions 
regarding the nature of the verbs and DPs occurring in these constructions.  
 
5.3.  The Distribution of CQs 
 
The de re analysis predicts that CQs will only be available with factive verbs, 
since only factive verbs select for an argument that characterizes both the external 
(res) and the internal content of the attitude. This proposal provides an account of 
the restricted distribution of CQs alternative to Grimshaw’s. According to 
Grimshaw, the availability of CQ-readings depends on the syntactic and semantic 
selection properties encoded in the lexical entry of the verb. Only verbs of the 
know-class - those that syntactically subcategorize for DPs and that semantically 
select questions- admit CQ-readings of their complement DP. In Section 4.2.2, 
however, we saw that examples (23a-c) satisfy syntactic subcategorization and are 
grammatical, but they do not have CQ-readings. The de re analysis of CQs offers 
an account of those cases. Under this view, the reason for which examples (23a-
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 c), together with (4a-c) and (5a-c), do not have CQ-readings is that none of the 
verbs involved in these examples are factive.  
To sum up, the de re analysis has at least two advantages on its 
competitors. On the one hand, it offers a unified account of both definite and 
indefinite CQs. On the other hand, it provides an alternative to Grimshaw’s 
account of the restricted distribution of CQs that can predict the unavailability of 
CQ-readings in (23a-c). In the next section, I will return to the contrast in 
meaning between CQs and their embedded question-counterparts (Section 3.2) 
and I will propose an account of it based on world-variable binding constraints.  
 
 
6.  Accounting for Greenberg’s Contrast 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2, CQs and their embedded-question counterparts can 
differ in meaning (10a-b, repeated below). The embedded-question sentence (10b) 
has a reading that is absent in (10a): while (10a) can only mean that John found 
out the identity of the murderer of Smith, (10b) can also mean that John found out 
something about the person referred to as ‘the murderer of Smith’.  
 
(10)  a. John found out the murderer of Smith. 
 b. John found out who the murderer of Smith was. 
 
I will argue that the contrast between CQs and their question counterparts can be 
explained in terms of binding principles for world variables and the way these 
principles apply to the different structures projected by CQs and embedded 
questions. Following Percus (2000), I will assume that: 
 
1.  Syntactic structures contain silent pronouns that denote variables ranging over 
possible worlds (indexed items of the form w1, w2, w3) and variable abstractors 
(indexed items of the form λ,, λ2, λ3 ).13  
2.  Verbs project a structure that includes a world variable. 
3.  Intensional verbs trigger the introduction of a world variable binder λi adjoined 
to the maximal projection of their internal argument.14 
4.  Definite descriptions also contain a world variable.   
 
With these assumptions in mind, we can restate the contrast between (10a) and 
(10b) in this way. Suppose that the murderer of Smith in the actual world is Bill. 
Then, what (10a) says is that John has a de re belief about Bill. The internal 
content of this belief is that Bill has the property of being identical to the person 
that the murderer of Smith refers to in John’s belief worlds (this is traditionally 
called an opaque reading of the definite description). On the other hand, (10b) is 
                                                 
13Percus uses situation variables. For the purpose of our discussion, the choice between world 
and situation variables is irrelevant.  
14Percus does not specify exactly what is responsible for the introduction of a world variable 
binder into the syntactic structure, but in the cases at hand, we could imagine it happens to create 
arguments of the right type, or because of lexical information encoded in the intensional verb. 
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 ambiguous: apart from the opaque reading, it has a reading in which John found 
out something else about Bill, but he is ignorant about the murder. In this case, the 
murderer of Smith is used to refer to the murderer in the actual world rather than 
in John’s belief worlds (the definite description, in this case, is said to have a 
transparent use). Structurally, the two readings correspond to different syntactic 
representations. The opaque reading corresponds to a structure in which the world 
variable inside the definite description is bound by the λ introduced by the 
intensional operator. In contrast, the transparent reading corresponds to a structure 
in which the world variable inside the definite description is anchored to the 
actual world.  
The problem is now reduced to understanding why in (10a) the world 
variable inside the definite description has to be bound by the world binder 
introduced by the intensional verb, while in (10b) it can be free. I will suggest that 
a constraint against vacuous binding will do the work. The following one is 
adapted from Kratzer (1999): 
 
(32) Constraint against vacuous binding: A world binder λ must bind the 
world variable selected by the lexical head of its extended projection. 
 
Once we adopt this constraint, we can explain the contrast. In (10b), the 
intensional binder binds the world variable introduced by the VP. This satisfies 
the constraint against vacuous binding and hence, the world variable in the 
complement DP can remain free (i.e. it can get the same index of the intensional 
binder or be anchored to the actual world). This generates two possible structures: 
 
(33) 
a. [IP… John [VP knows …λ1 [CP who [IP ...[VP  w1 [DP the murderer…w1] … is]]] 
b. [IP… John [VP knows …λ1 [CP who [IP ...[VP  w1 [DP the murderer…w0] … is]]] 
                                                               
In (10a), on the other hand, there is no VP introducing a world variable that can 
be bound by the intensional operator and, consequently, the variable inside the 
definite description has to be bound by the intensional binder to satisfy the 
constraint against vacuous binding. This leaves the opaque reading of the definite 
description as the only option: 
 
(34)  [IP… John [VP knows …λ1 [DP … the murderer… w1]] 
 
 
7.  Further Issues and Open Remarks 
 
7.1.  More Complex res Arguments 
 
So far we have considered cases in which the res argument of the belief ascription 
is an individual that satisfies the extension of the property in the actual world (or 
the maximal individual, in the case of plurals). Cresswell and von Stechov (1982), 
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 however, argued that de re beliefs can involve more complex res arguments.15 In 
what follows, I will argue that relational nouns with unsaturated arguments are 
examples of CQs involving more complex res arguments.  
Imagine a context in which the price of several objects is at issue. Imagine 
that Susie knows the price of one of those objects. She knows, for example, that a 
bottle of milk costs $1.29. In this context, an utterance of (35a) is not felicitously 
paraphrased by (35b): 
 
(35) a. Susie knows a price. 
 b. Susie knows of $1.29 that it is a price 
 
However, (35b) is the only meaning we predict for (35a). If price denotes a 
property of individual objects, then the de re analysis predicts that (35a) is true if 
there is a particular price (i.e. a particular dollar amount) in the actual world of 
which Susie knows it is a price. However, these truth-conditions are too weak. We 
can imagine a scenario in which Susie is aware of the fact that $1.29 is a price 
without being aware that it is the price of milk, or the price of anything at all.  
 Following previous analyses of relational nouns (Barker 2001, Nathan 
2006), I assume that these nouns denote a relation that holds of pairs of objects 
rather than a property of single individuals. Under this view, the lexical entry of 
price, in its relational sense, would look like (36): 
 
(36) [[price]] = λx λy λw. price of (x, y) in w                     <e <e, st>> 
 
The reading of (35a) in the above scenario (35b) can be derived as shown below: 
 
(37) a. Susie knows of <$1.29, milk> that they are in the price of relation.  
 b. [[Susie knows a price]] (w0) = 
      ∃x ∃y [price-of (x)(y)(w0) & ∀w (DoxS(w0)(w) → price-of (x)(y)(w))] 
 
To conclude, when price is used in its relational sense, the res argument is not 
simply an individual that satisfies the property in the actual world (i.e. a dollar 
amount), but rather a pair of individuals that are in the relation denoted by the 
noun in the actual world.16,17 
                                                 
15In the simplest case a de re belief involves ascribing a one-place property to an individual 
but “there is no reason why a many-place property cannot be ascribed to things other than 
individuals.” (Cresswell and von Stechov, 1982: 505). 
16Of course, price can also be used in a non-relational sense, as exemplified by (i) below: 
(i) The cashier knew the price that John paid. It was $ 66. 
17Things, however, can get even more complicated. Consider example (iia) from Heim (1979) 
and   its intended reading in (iib): 
(ii) a. John knows the price that Fred knows.  
  b. John knows the price Fred knows. It’s the price of the new iBook (but  
             John doesn’t know how much the iBook costs).  
In order to capture reading (iib), we do not want a res argument corresponding to a specific 
dollar amount, nor to a pair consisting of an object and its actual price. Neither of these res 
arguments would give us the right truth conditions of (iib). What I would like to suggest is that, in 
this case, the res argument is the whole individual concept corresponding to the function the price 
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 7.2.  CQs and Relational Nouns 
 
It has been noted in the literature (Caponigro and Heller 2003, Nathan 2006) that 
the typical examples of definite CQs involve relational nouns, ‘nouns whose 
interpretation depend on an additional argument’ (Caponigro & Heller 2003: 
26).18 Plain non-relational nouns can hardly be interpreted as CQs, as shown by 
(38) and (39): 
 
(38) #Sue knows the shoes. 
(39) #Fabio knows the carburetor. 
 
The oddness of (38) and (39) is quite unexpected under the de re analyses of CQs. 
According to this proposal, any property-denoting DP should be able to be 
interpreted as a CQ when embedded under a factive verb. However, the contrast 
between (38)-(39) and (1a-c) suggests that more than this might be going on. 
Based on examples like (38)-(39), Nathan (2006) suggested that CQs can only be 
derived from relational nouns by special type-shifting operations. However, the 
notion of relational noun is not a simple one to work with. First of all, what 
prevents us from considering shoes and carburetor as relational? Why can’t we 
describe them as denoting functions from shoes to shoes’ brands or from shoes to 
shoes’ owners? Second, there are several examples involving relational nouns that 
sound as odd as (38)-(39). Some examples are shown in (40): 
 
(40) #Mary knows/found out the father/the sister/the leg/the home. 
 
Third, as Caponigro and Heller pointed out, as soon as non-relational DPs are 
modified in some way (by adding a relative clause, a superlative etc), the CQ-
reading becomes accessible. Compare (38)-(39) with (41): 
 
(41) a. Sue knows the shoes that will be fashionable next season. 
     b.  Fabio knows the best carburetor on the market. 
   
In which sense are the examples in (41) relational? And why do these types of 
nominal modifications affect the availability of CQs? To my knowledge, there 
exists no definitive answer to this question in the literature.19 
                                                                                                                                     
of the new iBook. For a more detailed discussion of this example, see Romero (2005) and Nathan 
(2006).  
18Caponigro and Heller use the expression ‘functional nouns’. However, since NPs in general 
denote functions, I will use the expression ‘relational nouns’ to avoid confusion. 
19One might make the following conjecture. Maybe the reason why (41a) is better than (38) is 
that the relative clause in (41) provides an informative property that was missing in (38). 
Intuitively, (38) might be unacceptable because in normal circumstances, the statement I know of 
this entity that it is shoes might sound odd and uninformative. It is hard to imagine a situation in 
which someone might be acquainted with shoes without knowing that they are shoes. By adding a 
relative clause in (41), on the other hand, we are contributing an informative property (being the 
shoes that will be fashionable next season) and turning the statement into an informative one. 
However, this explanation doesn’t works so well for (39). In this case, knowing what a carburetor 
is, being able to identify it among other parts of your car, is a much less trivial fact than knowing 
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 Moreover, notice that getting a CQ-reading from examples in (35)-(36) 
might be hard, but crucially not impossible. Consider the following scenario: 
 
The guessing game 
Imagine you are involved in the following game: you have been presented with a 
series of objects: a pair of shoes, a carburetor and a pair of scissors. Your 
challenge is to look at the objects for 3 minutes and memorize the way they look. 
After that, you will be shown only little parts of them and you will have to tell 
what they are. Imagine you were only successful with the shoes. Then, you can 
report that by saying: “I didn’t win. I only knew the shoes”. 
 
To conclude, definite CQs are easier when the object DP contains a relational 
noun, other property-denoting NPs need more contextual support and seem harder 
to get. However, they are still possible, as the de re analysis predicts.  
 
 
8.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I discussed three approaches to DP-CQs: the question-in-disguise 
approach, the individual concept approach and the de re analysis. In Section 3, I 
presented three arguments against the question-in-disguise approach and 
concluded that CQs do not denote questions. In Section 4, I briefly reviewed 
Heim and Romero’s individual concept approach and concluded that, although it 
doesn’t face the same difficulties of the question-in-disguise approach, it still 
doesn’t provide an independent account of the restricted distribution of CQs nor 
does it easily apply to indefinite CQs. As an alternative, I proposed the de re 
analysis of CQs and I showed that this solution captures the restricted distribution 
of CQs, and it correctly characterizes the truth-conditions of both definite and 
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